Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 19

Issue 1

Article 6

9-1-2012

Rising to the Surface: Disasters and Racial Health Disparities in
American History
Marian Moser Jones

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Social
Welfare Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marian Moser Jones, Rising to the Surface: Disasters and Racial Health Disparities in American History,
19 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 19 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol19/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Rising to the Surface: Disasters and Racial
Health Disparities in American History
By Marian Moser Jones*
Disasters are fundamentally social and cultural phenomena.1 Often,
the solutions to disaster preparedness [and] response do not just involve
technology.2 Of course we need warning systems, and of course, it is great
to know that a hurricane is coming two days ahead of time [so] we can get
out of the way.3 But fundamentally, we have to look at our society and
inequalities in our society, and cultural differences in order to address how
to get human beings out of harm’s way and to mitigate disasters.4 So before
I begin, I would like to warn you about the history of disasters and health
disparities in the United States. This history is not for the faint of heart.
You are law students, so you have probably crossed that bridge already in
torts classes and other classes. But this not for those who would rather
avoid discussing the unseemly and uncomfortable aspects of our shared past
as Americans.
And neither is it for those [who] believe that history should be told exclusively by survivors. In this particular corner of American history, the
history of disasters, the anonymous dead have possessed the uncanny
ability to rise to the surface and to help the living speak truth to power. The
1927 Mississippi flood, an archetypal example of health disparities in
disaster, presents a case in point. Two months after the flood began, in June
* Ph.D., M.P.H, an Assistant Professor of Family Science at University of Maryland
School of Public Health, and author of THE AMERICAN RED CROSS FROM CLARA BARTON TO
THE NEW DEAL.
1. See Anthony Oliver-Smith, “What is a Disaster?: Anthological Perspectives on a
Persistent Question,” in THE ANGRY EARTH (Anthony Oliver-Smith & Susana Hoffman eds.,
1999) (describing different approaches and the difficulties involved in defining “disasters”).
2. See James R. Elliot & Jeremy Pais, Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina: Social
Differences in Human Responses to Disaster, 35 SOC. SCI. RES., no. 2, 318 (2006) (“The
basic idea would be to buttress top-down warnings with ongoing planning and preparedness
orchestrated through trusted local associations, similar to how school teachers help to
educate and evacuate their own groups of students when an ominous but distant bell sounds
and the entire school must evacuate.”).
3. See Amy L. Fairchild et. al., The Challenge of Mandatory Evacuation: Providing
For and Deciding For, 25 HEALTH AFF., no. 4, 958 (describing the role of government and
public health officials in ordering mandatory evaluations in the face of impending disaster).
4. See Elliot & Pais, supra note 2, at 317 (analyzing the correlation between race,
class, and the adequacy of disaster relief in the context of Hurricane Katrina).
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1927, a correspondent for the Chicago Defender, which was the leading
African American newspaper in the country, reported that the health officer
in Greenville, Mississippi, had given typhoid inoculations “earlier in the
week in his office to whites only.”5
Typhoid inoculations were
[considered] a key protective measure against infections from this deadly
water-born bacillus, this microbe that tends to flourish in standing pools of
water that accompany floods and hurricanes.6 But he had limited his vaccinations to whites.7 “Members of our race are still suffering from measles,
mumps, and typhoid. ‘They received very little treatment, and those who
die are cut open, filled with sand, and then tossed into the Mississippi
River,’ the correspondent wrote.”8 Now as this painful example illustrates,
disaster-related disparities have long plagued the United States, even if the
field of health disparities, named as such, is a relatively new area of inquiry
and policy. In this talk I will briefly outline the short history of health
disparities as a field, and discuss the connection between health disparities
and disasters and then review several historical examples of health
disparities in 20th century U.S. disasters and their lessons for current policy.
“Health disparities,” as an identified field of federally-sponsored
public health research, can be dated back only to January 1984.9 That is
5. See MARIAN MOSER JONES, THE AMERICAN RED CROSS: FROM CLARA BARTON TO
NEW DEAL 216 (2013) (describing the state of black Mississippians after the Great
Mississippi Flood of 1927); Mary E. Stovall, The ‘Chicago Defender’ in the Progressive
Era, 83 ILL. HIST. J. 159 (1990). See also CHARLES A. SIMMONS, THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
PRESS: A HISTORY OF NEWS COVERAGE DURING NATIONAL CRISES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO FOUR BLACK NEWSPAPERS 1827-1965, 25–42 (1998).
6. Typhoid inoculations were used widely in the early to mid-twentieth century to
protect flood and hurricane victims, but were by the late 1970s deemed to be of limited
usefulness, as they do not confer immunity immediately, and the danger of infection has
usually passed by the time they are effective. See Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report,
U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Dec. 17, 1994, Vol. 43, No. RR-14 (describing the
importance of typhoid inoculations for residents of flood areas). But see Ira V. Hiscock,
Public Health Work in the Flood Area, 17 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 810–13 (1927) (describing
widespread typhoid inoculations during the 1927 flood). See also Melvina F. Palmer, Health
Activities to Combat Flood Damage, 71 PUB. HEALTH REP. 822 (1956), (describing the over
40,000 typhoid inoculations resulting from the 1956 Pennsylvania flood).
7. See Jones, supra note 5, at 216 (“In early June, The Defender reported that the
health officer in Greenville, Mississippi, gave typhoid inoculations earlier in the week at his
office to whites only.”).
8. Id.
9. See MARGARET M. HECKLER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.: REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON BLACK & MINORITY HEALTH, at ix (Washington: GPO,
1985) [hereinafter “Report of the Secretary’s Task Force”] available at http://min
orityhealth.hhs.gov/assets/pdf/checked/1/ANDERSON.pdf (“a continuing disparity . . . ”,
“an affront to . . . ”).
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when President Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Human Services, Margaret
Heckler, in her annual report card on the health status of Americans, called
attention to what she later called “a continuing disparity in the burden of
death and illness experienced by blacks and other minority Americans as
compared with our nation’s population as whole.”10 Inveighing against this
disparity as “an affront to both our ideals and to the ongoing genius of
American medicine,” Heckler went on to organize a task force at the
National Institutes of Health on black and minority health.11 This task force
in [its] 1985 report painstakingly documented the [nearly] 60,000 yearly
excess deaths among black and other racial minority populations in
comparison to white Americans.12 As Vanessa Northington Gamble and
Deborah Stone have noted, this report catapulted minority health issues
onto the nation’s research and health policy agendas.13 The Department of
Health and Human Services created an Office of Minority Health at HHS
and NIH—the National Institutes of Health—an Office of Research [on]
Minority Health. In 2010, 25 years later, this became the National Institute
on Minority Health and Health Disparities.14 In the meantime, the federal
government and most states identified the elimination of health disparities
between whites and racial minorities, along with socioeconomic health
disparities as key public health goals.15
But it is important to note that long before Heckler’s call to arms,
researchers and health officials were documenting and striving to address
racial gaps in health access and health outcomes. In his 1906 study, The
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Vanessa Northington Gamble & Deborah Stone, U.S. Policy on Health Inequities:
The Interplay of Politics and Research, 31 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL’Y AND LAW 105 (2006)
(synthesizing the relationship between scientific research and government action in
addressing health inequalities in America).
14. NATI’L INST. ON MINORITY HEALTH AND HEALTH DISPARITIES: History, NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/organization/NIM HD.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2013) (describing the mission and history of National Institute on Minority Health
and Health Dispartites) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). See also
OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., About OMH,
http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/browse.aspx?Lvl =1&lvlID =7 (last visited Feb. 13,
2013) (detailing the purpose and working of OMH) (on file with the WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST.).
15. See Gamble & Stone, supra note 13, at 105 (citing JOHN E. MCDONOUGH ET AL., A
STATE POLICY AGENDA TO ELIMINATE RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 11 (The
Commonwealth Fund 2004) (describing the disparities between minority health and health
care, and the health and health care of whites)).
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Health and Physique of the Negro American, sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois
used federal census reports and vital statistics, as well as life insurance data,
to identify the disparities in health status between black and white Americans, even if he did not use the word “disparities.”16 Now unlike the white
statistician Frederick Hoffman, who argued that these differences resulted
from the inherent genetic inferiority of African Americans (this was a
widely-held assumption), Du Bois implicated environmental causes.17 By
environmental causes, I mean the lack of sanitation in segregated neighborhoods where black Americans were forced to live, along with the lack of
educational and economic opportunity faced by African Americans, as the
fundamental reasons for this disparity. Now Du Bois was interesting—he
did not stop at research, but he actively advocated for the elimination of the
underlying limits on educational and economic opportunities that he
believed led to these disparities.18
Du Bois’ expansive approach can inspire us to look at contemporary
health disparities with a fresh perspective. Most recent health disparities
research has been funded by federal and state governments, and as such it
reflects the focus and the constraints of the federal health disparities
research and policy agenda. Now this agenda was shaped by the 1985 task
force report, which identified six major causes of excess mortality among
African Americans: cancer; cardiovascular disease and stroke; chemical
dependency measured by cirrhosis; diabetes; homicide and accidents; and
infant mortality.19 Since then, health disparities research has mainly focused on eliminating or reducing disparities related to these six diseases.
Now this makes sense, as focusing on concrete, achievable goals will more
likely lead to progress than a more diffused approach. But when we think
about disaster, most disaster-related health disparities do not easily fall into
these six categories; even though disasters do increase rates of accidents
and may increase rates of chronic disease. Disasters involve multiple
16. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE HEALTH AND PHYSIQUE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN: A
STUDY MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY BY THE ELEVENTH ATLANTA
CONFERENCE, Preface, 20–21 (1906) (discussing the anthropological evidence countering
inherent inferiority of “negroes”) (quoted in Stone & Gamble, supra note 6, at 93).
17. Compare FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE
AMERICAN NEGRO (1896) (arguing that disparities in health statuses between whites and
African Americans were a result of African Americans’ genetic inferiority), with W.E.B. DU
BOIS, THE HEALTH AND PHYSIQUE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN: A STUDY MADE UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY BY THE ELEVENTH ATLANTA CONFERENCE (1906)
(suggesting that health disparities are caused, in part, by environmental factors).
18. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: A BIOGRAPHY 1–4 (2009).
19. See Report of the Secretary’s Taskforce, supra note 9, at 3–5.
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moving parts: weather, technology, geology, prior urban settlement
patterns, transportation networks, [and] communication networks, to name
a few. And unlike diabetes, heart disease, accidents, or other similar
diseases, disasters cannot be tied easily to bodies and behaviors. In fact, the
word “disaster” itself is a fungible and fuzzy construct. Geographer Ben
Wisner’s definition of disaster, as [the interaction of] a technological or
natural hazard and a vulnerable human population has been increasingly
adopted by scientists.20 But even this definition is up for debate, although I
generally espouse this definition.
Now as a result of this complexity, disaster-related health disparities
remain little studied and little understood. In the 21st century, such disparities risk becoming obscured by the monstrous shadow of Hurricane
Katrina. Indeed, Katrina and its aftermath made it clear that structural
racism and poverty can increase a population’s vulnerability to the hazards
of weather.21 But little research has explored disaster-related health
disparities outside of the specific context of this hurricane—and I do not
mean to say this [storm] is not very important to study. But if we only study
Katrina, we risk falling into the trap of dismissing disaster-related health
disparities as originating out of the unique geographic, cultural, and
political context of New Orleans, 2005. And this would be a dangerous
error, because history, even the recent history of the United States in the
20th century, tells us that disaster-related racial health disparities have
recurred across divergent temporal and social contexts.
The 1906 San Francisco earthquake, which led to a fire that burned
down a large swath of that city, including the city’s Chinatown, left the
nation’s largest Asian population homeless.22 Forced into a single,
segregated refugee camp, denied financial assistance from the Red Cross
and other charitable groups, Chinese San Franciscans, together with the
small Japanese San Francisco population, were targeted by xenophobic
white thugs with violent attacks.23 Members of the armed forces who
20. See BEN WISNER ET. AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY
AND DISASTERS, 4–5 (2nd ed. 2004) (proffering a definition of the term disaster).
21. See KEITH WAILOO ET AL., KATRINA’S IMPRINT: RACE AND VULNERABILITY IN
AMERICA 1–8 (2010); Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires, Pre-Katrina: Post-Katrina,
in THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE
KATRINA 1–11 (Hartman & Squires, eds., 2006) (noting the correlation between race and
suffering harm from dangerous weather).
22. See YONG CHEN, CHINESE SAN FRANCISCO, 1850–1943: A TRANS-PACIFIC
COMMUNITY 3 (2000) (describing America’s largest Asian population).
23. See JONES, supra note 5, at chap. 7 (describing the attacks). See also PHILIP L.
FRADKIN, THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE AND FIRESTORMS OF 1906: HOW SAN FRANCISCO NEARLY
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policed the area following the earthquake in an undeclared regime of
martial law, were ordered to shoot looters on sight. And evidence from
newspapers and other sources indicates that a disproportionate number of
those shot and killed, no questions asked, were Asian San Franciscans.24
After the disaster, when Chinatown was rebuilt, structures were erected
quickly, without regard to considerations of safety and crowding. And here
is where you get to law, because zoning laws were very lax and not
enforced. The residents of Chinatown were barred from living elsewhere in
the city and were forced to live in a cramped labyrinth of rickety, dangerous
housing. As a result, rates of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases,
which were fostered by crowded, unsanitary conditions, subsequently
increased in this area. In the years following the earthquake, although rates
of TB among all San Franciscans increased as crowded tenements were
built to house the city’s white working class citizens as well, rates of TB
among Chinese San Franciscans reached three times that of the city’s
population as a whole and four times the national average.25,26
We can take another case, twenty years later, on the opposite coast.
When a major hurricane ran over Miami [in September 1926], most of the
city’s diverse, black, Caribbean and African American communities were
protected from instant death, largely because of the city’s strict regime of
racial segregation, which restricted ownership of oceanfront property and
enjoyment of its beaches to whites. Now the storm rolled over the city at
night, when few black Miamians were working at these racially restricted
[residential] areas.27 So you see here, what seems to appear is a reverse
pattern of racial disparity and mortality. But this pattern was soon overDESTROYED ITSELF, 164–166, 182 (2005); Marshall Everett, Chinese Give Generously, in
THE COMPLETE STORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE 196 (1906).
24. See PHILIP L. FRADKIN, THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE AND FIRESTORMS OF 1906: HOW
SAN FRANCISCO NEARLY DESTROYED ITSELF 296−303 (2005) (documenting the hostilities
against Asian San Franciscans through personal stories and newspaper articles).
25. See SUSAN CRADDOCK, CITY OF PLAGUES: DISEASE, POVERTY AND DEVIANCE IN
SAN FRANCISCO 38−42 (2000) (discussing the overcrowded tenements and result of
increased tuberculosis amongst minorities because of the living conditions).
26. See id. at 202−04 (citing a report from the San Francisco Tuberculosis Association
in 1915).
27. See Paul S. George, Colored Town: Miami’s Black Community, 1896–1930, 56
THE FLORIDA HIST. QUARTERLY 432, 435 (1978) (“Residential segregation, the cornerstone
of racial separation, was from the beginning the rule in Miami.”); see also NATHAN DANIEL
BEAU CONNOLLY, BY EMINENT DOMAIN: RACE AND CAPITAL IN THE BUILDING OF AN
AMERICAN SOUTH FLORIDA 40−43 (UMI Dissertation Publishing 2008) (recounting the story
of Wilhelmina Jennings, a Bahamian-American who was ordered to clean up destruction
from the 1926 hurricane).
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turned when white National Guardsmen began rounding up black men and
women to do cleanup work, exposing them to typhoid and malaria from
standing water, as well as the hazards of exposed nails, splintered wood,
and snakes that slithered through the flooded neighborhoods.28 Other black
Miamians who had lost their homes in what they called “The Big Blow,”29
were forced to live in the single refugee camp for African Americans,
which was located in the unsanitary stables of the local racetrack, which
had also been damaged in the hurricane. They were given limited aid by the
American Red Cross.30
Perhaps the most egregious example of racial disparities in a disaster
during this period, however, occurred during the aforementioned 1927
Mississippi Flood. By early April of 1927, the flood had turned the Delta
region of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi into what a National
Geographic reporter described as “a vast sheet of water . . . about 1,050
miles long and in some places, over 50 miles in width.”31 The flood
drowned hundreds of people while destroying the region’s crops and
livestock. Local white planters, the owners of plantations, enlisted black
men, often by force and sometimes at gunpoint, to work long shifts sandbagging the levees and building out the levees and, as a result, exposing
them to [a] higher risk of drowning when the flood overtopped the levees.
And this happened on numerous occasions.32 Now for the 325,000 people
whose homes were flooded, the American Red Cross set up raciallysegregated tent camps in keeping with the local custom and national
28. See id. (using Wilhelmina Jennings’ story about the pressure for blacks to do the
hard labor in the clean-up).
29. See The Hurricane of 1926, PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/a
mex/miami/peopleevents/pande07.html (giving history on the 1926 hurricane in Miami and
referring to it as “The Big Blow”).
30. See MARION MOSER JONES, CONFRONTING CALAMITY: THE AMERICAN RED CROSS
AND THE POLITICS OF DISASTER RELIEF, 1881–1939, 516−18 (UMI Dissertation Publishing
2008) (discussing the difficulties faced by black families as a result of racial segregation
policies).
31. Frederick Simplish, The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
MAG., Sept. 1927, at 272.
32. See Robyn Spencer, Contested Terrain: The Mississippi Flood of 1927 and the
Struggle to Control Black Labor, 79 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 170−78 (1994), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2717627.pdf?acceptTC=true (discussing the precarious
situation whereby blacks were forced to continue working for whites and efforts were made
to prevent other opportunities from being presented to black workers); see also PETE
DANIEL, DEEP’N AS IT COME: THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOOD 68−72 (2d ed., Univ. of
Ark. Fayetteville Press 1996) (quoting a worker remembering armed guards along the levee
and the dangers of getting around).
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practice.33 Most African Americans in the area were just tenant farmers in
the oppressive sharecropping system, which required them to rent their
land, food, and supplies, often at high rates of interest charged by the
planters who owned the land, and then pay back this with a portion of their
crops. This system caused most sharecroppers, black and white, to slip into
a cycle of indebtedness from which they could not escape except by fleeing
the area. And the planters often prevented the sharecroppers from fleeing by
force and intimidation.34 Many sharecroppers lived in flimsy cabins along
the rich soil of the flood plain, while planters and white merchants who
serviced the plantation economy lived in solid, multiple-story homes on
high ground. So during the flood, these more affluent whites could simply
decamp to the second story or attic of their home until the flood receded
from their first floor. Most black sharecroppers had nowhere to go except
for the refugee camps established by the American Red Cross.35 The Red
Cross, which was a quasi-governmental organization that followed the
American governmental tradition of privileging local autonomy over
centralized national control, largely allowed the white Southerners to run
these camps.36 Not surprisingly, the conditions of the camps for African
American flood sufferers were squalid, and conditions at the white camps,
which were less crowded, were better.37 A correspondent from the Chicago
Defender who visited the black camps wrote, that “epidemics of measles,
whooping cough, mumps, scarlet fever, and chicken pox were raging in
these camps.”38 The African American camps were also patrolled by white
National Guardsmen who were instructed not to let the residents leave.39
The local planters feared with good reason that many of the sharecroppers,
33. See JONES, supra note 30, at 198−224 (using information from the American Red
Cross to discuss the people that were displaced and the efforts the Red Cross undertook in
their relief effort).
34. See JONES, supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also JOHN M. BARRY, RISING
TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 192−97
(1998) (noting how much work was to be done during the floods and that the more difficult
labor was given almost exclusively to blacks who were beaten, jailed, or shot if they refused
to work).
35. See JONES, supra note 5, at 208−210, 214 citing JOHN PAYNE, AMERICAN
NATIONAL RED CROSS, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY FLOOD DISASTER OF 1927: FINAL REPORT OF
THE COLORED ADVISORY COMMISSION 100–05 (1929).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See J. Winston Harrington, Rush Food and Clothing to Flood Victims, CHICAGO
DEFENDER, Apr. 30, 1927, at 1.
39. See JONES, supra note 5, at 216.
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provided with free transportation by government and Red Cross boats,
would decide to leave the area for the industrial North where racial and
employment conditions were somewhat better. 40 Most infamously, local
planters in Greeneville, Mississippi, set up a heavily patrolled long-term
camp for black residents along the muck of the town’s levy.41 As one
report noted, the levy tops were concentration camps of misery and disease,
where “[m]ud, rain, cold, hunger, exposure [and] hopelessness led to fatal
results.”42
Now food rations at the refugee camps throughout the flooded area,
according to the Red Cross’s own reports, were limited to sparse regimens
of salted meat, beans, sugar, salt, potatoes, cornmeal, flour, and rice. They
excluded dairy products, fruits, and vegetables entirely. With vegetable
gardens flooded and cattle drowned, people had no inexpensive way to
supplement this inadequate diet with fruits, vegetables, and dairy products.43 As a result, rates of pellagra, a disease caused by a dietary deficiency of niacin, shot up. U.S. Public Health Service officials, more than a
decade earlier, had documented that pellagra, which causes skin rashes,
diarrhea, dementia, and death, was endemic among the poor black and
white Southerners, with rates higher among African Americans due to their
greater rates of poverty.44 Now the Red Cross sought the advice of the
Public Health Service to try to stem the epidemic of pellagra following the
flood.45 Nutritional yeast proved helpful but came too late to prevent many
cases.46
In June, when the flood waters began to subside, many black sharecroppers were rounded up and forced to return to the still-flooded plan-

40. See JONES, supra note 5, at 216–217 (citing J. Winston Harrington, Use Troops In
Flood Area to Imprison Farm Hands, CHICAGO DEFENDER, May 7, 1927, at 1).
41. See JONES, supra note 5, at 208.
42. Id. at 207 (citing Report to Grand Lodge of Masons, United Masonic Relief in The
Japanese Earthquake of 1923, the Florida Hurricane of 1926, the Mississippi Flood of 1927,
the Porto Rico Hurricane of 1928, and the Florida hurricane of 1928, at 18 (1931)).
43. See id. at 209, citing AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, Army Memos, RG 200
(1927).
44. See Joseph Goldberger, The Etiology of Pellagra: The Significance of Certain
Epidemiological Observations with Respect Thereto, 29 PUB. HEALTH REP. 26 (Jun. 26,
1914); see also ALAN M. KRAUT, GOLDBERGER’S WAR: THE LIFE AND WORK OF A PUBLIC
HEALTH CRUSADER 98–99, 119, 188, 216–218 (2003).
45. See JONES, supra note 5, at 213.
46. See JONES, supra note 5, at 213 (citing C.W. Warburton to James Fieser, group 2,
RG 200).
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tations where they lived.47 Pools of standing water and unscreened cattle
exposed them to malaria, another fatal scourge in the South at this time.
Now although the Rockefeller Foundation provided matching funds for
state and local health departments to increase efforts to fight these diseases
following the flood, these efforts were short-lived and ill-supported by
Southern state governments, which had little interest in helping the poor
black residents whom whites had disenfranchised decades earlier.48
But this is not just a story of victimization and neglect. During the
flood, the NAACP sent undercover representatives to investigate the reports
of racial inequities that were coming out of the flooded area by people who
were leaving.49 The Chicago Defender, which also sent correspondents to
the area, kept discrimination against black flood sufferers on its front page.
And this chorus of protest led Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, who
was later known for his ability to keep his head in the sand while we were
heading into the Great Depression, to stand up and take notice. Hoover was
then serving as head of the President’s Special Flood Relief Committee.
Hoover organized an official investigation of racial discrimination in the
flood [which was] led by a prominent group of African American leaders
from Tuskegee Institute and other places.50 Now this investigation did not
remedy the greatest injustice[s]. [However,] over the long-term, these
protests and investigations did pressure the American Red Cross, which
was the nation’s leading disaster relief organization, to take pains to show
that it was trying to treat people of different racial groups fairly. In future
disasters, the American Red Cross hired more African American workers in
its disaster relief operations, more [African American] nurses, and more
[African American] social workers, and at the same time, this effort to fight
back empowered black leaders to proactively advocate for greater
engagement and increased racial equity in relief following future
disasters.51 So for African Americans, the flood represented both a social
disaster that increased their exposure to the neglect and hostility of the
Southern plantation whites, and an opportunity to learn how to expose this
47. See JONES, supra note 5, at 219 (citing Negro Commission, June 1927 Survey, box
744, group 2, RG 200)
48. See id.
49. See KENNETH ROBERT JANKEN, WALTER WHITE: MR. NAACP 82 (2006)
50. See JONES, supra note 5, at chap. 11 (citing THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COLORED
ADVISORY COMMISSION APPOINTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED
CROSS AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON RELIEF WORK IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY FLOOD
DISASTER OF 1927, AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS (1929)).
51. See id. at chap. 13–14.
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neglect and hostility in order to mitigate the blunt force of future
discrimination in disasters.
So what lessons do the 1927 flood, the 1906 earthquake, and the 1926
Miami hurricane hold for us now in 2012? First, and most obviously, they
tell us that disasters in the United States, long before Katrina, have been
associated with racially disparate patterns of morbidity and mortality.
Although causation is sometimes hard to establish when you see them,
coming from a public health background and try[ing] to establish causation
through statistical studies, a strong association certainly exists, in all of
these cases, between racial discrimination and patterns of illness and death.
Secondly, disasters throughout American history have exposed underlying
racial and socioeconomic health inequities, including those that are caused
by poor housing and associated with poor diet. Crowded and unsanitary
housing conditions had exposed Chinese San Franciscans to infectious
disease long before the 1906 earthquake. Most notably, in 1900, there was a
bubonic plague outbreak in [San Francisco], and it hit Chinatown first and
hardest.52 Similarly, inadequate housing left poor Mississippi Delta
residents, most of them African American, more vulnerable to the flood and
its health hazards than more affluent whites. But this same inadequate
housing—and we are talking about sharecroppers’ cabins with no [window
or door] screens—had long failed to protect these sharecroppers from
sanitary hazards and malaria.53 Dietary deficiencies of poor African
Americans and whites in the South were also well known by this time. The
Red Cross reproduction of what it called standard plantation rations,
together with the enhanced focus on the population [living] in refugee
camps following the flood, both underscored the problem and brought it to
light. Thirdly, we can learn that disasters and the social disorder that
follows them can create a climate where racially-motivated violence can
flourish. And this is another place where the law comes in, because
following many disasters in U.S. history in the 20th century, the military
groups—National Guard or other military groups—were given the authority
to shoot-on-sight any looters. And this does not always work out because
they use their discretion, and often individuals make mistakes or their own
prejudices become acted out. 54
52. See MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY P LAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN
SAN FRANCISCO 11–13 (2004).
53. See MARGARET HUMPHREYS, MALARIA: POVERTY, RACE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN
THE UNITED STATES 79–80 (2001).
54. See Jones, supra note 30, at 179 (citing CONNOLLY, supra note 27, at 41–42). See
also $100,000 for Relief Sent By Red Cross, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28 1926, at 6; Affidavit Says
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Now this pattern of racially-motivated violence also happened during
Katrina where there was a well-documented instance of [a] posse of heavily
armed white young men who killed as many as eighteen black men, and the
crime went unreported until investigated by journalists years later.55 Now
in the 1920s disasters discussed here the violence more often took the form
of forced labor than murder sprees. But there is little fundamental
difference between outright murder and [the] drowning death of men who
had the choice of fighting the Mississippi or facing the butt of a sawed-off
shotgun.
Lastly these case studies of disasters suggest that neglect, especially
neglect in an emergency situation, can more negatively affect the health and
mortality of minority and underserved populations than any other form of
discriminatory treatment. Failure by governmental and non-governmental
actors to provide people with adequate food, shelter, medical attention,
safety, and assistance in rebuilding their lives is perhaps the most obvious
cause of health disparities in disasters. Sometimes the effect of this neglect
may not become apparent until months or years later, as in the case of
tuberculosis in San Francisco. But there appears to be a clear relationship
between this immediate short-term neglect and long-term health vulnerabilities, [and this] deserves more attention. So in summary, by beginning to
look at these historical case studies of disasters and how different populations have been treated in widely divergent contexts, we can help to
begin to identify the most enduring sources of disaster-related health
disparities, and then we can formulate policy, including formal laws, that
seeks to address these issues and bring an end to such inequities.
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